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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(j) (1953 as amended) 
for the reason that this matter was transferred to the Utah Court 
of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court, 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did Standard waive its right to interpose the 
statute of frauds as a defense to the oral agreement to pay 
$1,000 per month for the third 36-month period of the written 
lease as a result of Standard's admission in its pleadings and at 
trial that it agreed to pay $1,000 per month? 
2. Did the lower court err by failing to conclude 
that the written lease and Standard's written checks dated Octo-
ber 20, 1988, and December 1, 1988, were insufficient to satisfy 
the statute of frauds? 
3. Did the trial court err by failing to conclude 
that English's change of the lock on October 18, 1988, precludes 
English from enforcing Standard's agreement to pay rent? 
4. Is the trial court's conclusion that English is 
entitled to damages for repairs and renovations made to the pre-
mises correct? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a landlord/tenant dispute. The case 
was tried in the Third Judicial District Court, County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on 
December 21 and 22, 1989. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge 
Murphy took the case under advisement, after which he ruled in 
favor of English. The Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and a Judgment on or about February 9, 1990. On 
May 17, 1990, the Court entered an Order denying Standard's 
Motion to Amend the Judgment. Standard filed a Notice of Appeal 
on June 7, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In 1974, plaintiff/respondent Dr. Daniel English 
("English") constructed a building located at 3525 Market Street, 
West Valley City, Utah (the "Leased Premises"), to be occupied by 
defendant/appellant Standard Optical Co. ("Standard") as the ten-
ant. See Trial Transcript ("Transcript"), Vol. I, p. 60-61. 
2. Standard took possession of the building and con-
tinuously occupied it as the tenant under the lease dated May 21, 
1973 (Trial Exhibit 3), and a subsequent lease dated August 10, 
1982 (the "Lease") (Trial Exhibit 4). See Transcript, Vol. I, 
pp. 60, 61, 65. 
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3. Until June, 1989, Standard was the only tenant to 
ever occupy the Leased Premises. See Trial Exhibits 3 and 4; 
Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 60-61, 65. 
4. Significant portions of the Lease are stated as 
follows: 
(a) To have and to hold said premises 
and office space under the terms of this 
agreement for a term of ten (10) years begin-
ning on the first day of the month following 
written notice to lessee from lessor and ter-
minating at midnight on the last day of the 
same month 10 years hence [i.e. 1992]. 
(b) The Lessee does hereby uncondition-
ally agree to pay as rent for the demised 
premises and to lessor, or order, at West 
Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah, the sum 
of $1,000 each month for 36 months with the 
first such installment to be due and payable 
on or before the first day of September, 
1982, and each installment payment to be due 
thereafter on or before the same calendar day 
during the term of the Agreement. A grace 
period of five days is given for the making 
of such installment payment. 
(c) The monthly rent specified in the 
section above shall be negotiated every 36 
months. 
(d) It is mutually understood and 
agreed by these parties that the demised pre-
mises herein will be used by the lessee as a 
retail optical business and lessee does 
hereby agree to use said premises for no 
other purpose without the written consent of 
lessor first had and obtained. However, such 
consent will not be unreasonably withheld. 
(e) It is mutually understood and 
agreed that the premises herein leased are in 
a condition of excellent repair . . . . 
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(f) The Lessee does hereby agree to at 
all times during the term of this agreement 
keep the heating and air conditioning units 
in a condition of good repair. 
(g) The Lessee hereby accepts the 
Leased Premises in a condition of good repair 
and does hereby agree to at all times during 
the term of this agreement to maintain the 
interior of the demised premises and to keep 
the same in a condition of good repair at all 
times, and agrees not to make any alterations 
to the demised premises without the written 
consent of the lessor first had and obtained, 
and then that all such alterations shall be 
made at the sole expense of the Lessee and 
that any such alterations as are then made a 
part of or attached to the building shall 
remain with the premises and become the prop-
erty of the Lessor at the end of this lease 
term. 
See Trial Exhibit 4 (emphasis added). 
5. In September, 1985, the parties negotiated a rent 
increase from $1,000 to $1,200 per month pursuant to the terms of 
paragraph (c) of the Lease for the second 36 month period of the 
Lease term. See R. at 189 (Findings of Fact, 1 3). 
6. In 1986 and 1987, Standard made the decision to 
convert its optical stores to "superstores" where possible, and 
in early 1988 began negotiations with Valley Fair Mall, located 
one block away from the Leased Premises. In June, 1988, Standard 
executed a lease with Valley Fair Mall for a superstore in the 
mall. See R. at 189 (Findings of Fact, U 4). 
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7. Despite the fact that the written Lease expressly 
provided for a ten-year lease term (and thus would expire in 
1992), prior to June, 1988, Standard understood the Lease term to 
expire at the end of August, 1988, with an option to negotiate a 
renewal* See R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, 11 6). 
8. On June 20, 1988, Klaus Rathke ("Rathke"), general 
manager of Standard, told English that Standard was moving the 
optical store located in the Leased Premises to the Valley Fair 
Mall. English informed Standard that the term of the Lease did 
not expire in 1988. See R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, I 7). 
9. Paragraph (c) of the Lease provides that the par-
ties would negotiate a rental amount every 36 months. The second 
36-month period concluded on August 31, 1988. See Trial Exhibit 
4. 
10. On or about June 30, 1988, Standard proposed to 
sublease the Leased Premises. English responded in writing that 
he would consider a proposal to sublease the Leased Premises. 
See R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, 1f 8). 
11. On July 5, 1988, English requested that Standard 
submit a list of proposed tenants for subletting the Leased Pre-
mises and suggested a meeting on September 15, 1988, to negoti-
ated a new rental amount. See R. at 190 (Findings of Fact, 
1 10). 
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12. July 17, 1988, was Standard's last day of business 
at the Leased Premises, See R. at 191 (Findings of Fact, 1f 11). 
13. On or about July 18, 1988, Standard moved its 
records and inventory from the Leased Premises and also moved 
attachments to the building, including built-in cabinets and 
counters in violation of Paragraph (g) of the Lease. See R. at 
191 (Findings of Fact, 11 12), Trial Exhibit 4. 
14. Several large signs were placed on the Leased Pre-
mises stating that Standard had moved. See R. at 191 (Findings 
of Fact, 1 12). 
15. By letter, dated July 20, 1988, Standard informed 
English that Standard had abandoned its plans to have a subsid-
iary of Standard sublet the Leased Premises but that Standard 
still wanted to sublet the premises to someone else. See R. at 
191 (Findings of Fact, 1f 13). 
16. In its July 20, 1988 letter, Standard further sug-
gested "an outright buyout of the lease." See Trial Exhibit 7. 
17. On July 22, 1988, English wrote Standard stating 
that he needed to know more about the proposed subtenant before 
he could give his approval. See R. at 191 (Findings of Fact, 
1 14). 
18. On August 1, 1988, Standard wrote English stating 
that Standard intended to negotiate for an $800 per month rent 
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amount beginning September 1, 1988. Alternatively, Standard pro-
posed a buy out of the Lease for $4,800 to be paid on September 
15, 1988. Se£ R. at 191 (Findings of Fact, 11 16). 
19. On September 26, 1988, Stephen Schubach 
("Schubach"), president of Standard, Rathke and English met to 
discuss the lease. English suggested that if Standard wanted to 
sublease, they should consider calling Weight Watchers. Schubach 
declared, "We're not in the leasing business, you are. Our busi-
ness is the optical business." See R. at 192 (Findings of Fact, 
11 17). 
20. English left the September 26, 1988, meeting with 
the understanding that Standard was not going to use the Leased 
Premises as a retail optical shop and that English was responsi-
ble for finding a tenant for the Leased Premises and that the 
parties would continue to negotiate a rent amount. See R. at 192 
(Findings of Fact, 1 18). 
21. No subtenant was ever presented to English by 
Standard. Standard's only effort toward obtaining a subtenant 
was to call and leave a message for Rick Trentman of Weight 
Watchers who English had previously suggested that Standard call. 
See R. at 193 (Findings of Fact H 22). 
22. In compliance with his understanding that he was 
responsible for finding a tenant, English had an access key made 
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for the Leased Premises on September 29, 1988, and upon entering 
the premises to inspect them, English found damage to the pre-
mises. See R. at 192 (Findings of Fact, 1f 19). 
23. On October 18, 1988, English changed the lock to 
the premises for the purpose of protecting the tools of the 
repairmen who would be working on the premises. See R. at 193 
(Findings of Fact, 1f 23). 
24. On October 20, 1988, Standard issued a check in 
the sum of $1,600, the check stub indicating that $800 was for 
September's rent and $800 was for October. See R. at 193 (Find-
ings of Fact, 1 24). 
25. English subsequently returned the $1,600 check to 
Standard because the parties had not yet agreed on a rent amount. 
See R. at 194 (Findings of Fact, 1f 26). 
26. During the first week of November, 1988, Schubach 
called English at his home and agreed that Standard would pay 
$1,000 per month rent. See R. at 194 (Findings of Fact, 11 28). 
27. Each time Standard sought access to the premises 
after the lock was changed, access was achieved. See R. at 194 
(Findings of Fact, 1 29). 
28. On or about November 7, 1988, English1s office 
gave the key to the premises to an employee of Standard. See R. 
at 194 (Findings of Fact, 11 30). 
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29. Between September lf 1988, and January 31, 1989, 
Standard only attempted to enter the Leased Premises on November 
5 or 7, 1988, the first part of October, 1988, November 4, 1988, 
and December 16, 1988. Standard was not denied access on any 
occasion it attempted to enter the Leased Premises. English's 
actions never deprived Standard of access to the premises. See 
R. at 194 (Findings of Fact, 1f 32). 
30. There is nothing in the record to show that Stan-
dard ever complained or was concerned about any alleged lack of 
possession until it filed an Answer to the Complaint. 
31. On November 21, 1988, English received back the 
$1,600 check, with the check stub notations changed to indicate 
that $1,000 was for September's rent and the remaining $600 was 
to be applied as a partial payment for October's rent. See R. at 
195 (Findings of Fact, 1 34). 
32. On November 21, 1988, Standard paid Utah Power and 
Light for electricity supplied to the Leased Premises up through 
October 18, 1988. See R. at 195 (Findings of Fact, 11 35). 
33. On December 5, 1988, English received a check from 
Standard for rent in the sum of $1,000. See R. at 195 (Findings 
of Fact, 1f 37). 
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34. On December 6, 1988, Standard paid Utah Power and 
Light for electricity supplied to the Leased Premises through 
November 18, 1988. See R. at 195 (Findings of Fact, U 38), 
35. In the Lease, Standard represents and agrees, on 
three separate occasions, regarding the condition of the premises 
at the beginning of the lease term: 
It is mutually understood and agreed 
that the premises herein leased are in a con-
dition of excellent repair . . . 
Trial Exhibit 4 (p. 2). 
Lessee hereby accepts the Leased Pre-
mises in a condition of good repair . . . 
Trial Exhibit 4 (p. 2). 
The Lessee does hereby agree to accept 
the demised premises in a state of good 
repair . . . 
Trial Exhibit 4 (p. 3). 
36. Standard failed to maintain the premises at all 
times in a clean and sanitary condition in accordance with good 
and reasonable standards of like commercial units. See R. at 196 
(Findings of Fact, 11 39). 
37. Standard removed attachments from the building and 
failed to maintain the furnace in a reasonable state of repair. 
See R. at 196 (Findings of Fact, 11 40, 41). 
38. English's and English's contractors' inspection of 
the premises revealed that it was reasonably necessary to repair 
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the following items which English did repair at a reasonable cost 
as follows: 
(a) The furnace was not working properly and the 
plumbing was damaged. Willard Hellstrom charged $619.86 for 
repairs. 
(b) Standard had removed numerous fixtures, 
including books built-in cabinets and counters. The removal left 
large and small holes in the walls and damaged the ceiling, walls 
and carpets. Also, the removal of the built-in cabinets left 
gaps in the trim. Additionally, Standard had failed to fix a 
plumbing leak which had damaged the bathroom walls, cabinets and 
left the floor tiles curling. The damage to the walls, ceiling 
and bathroom trim was repaired with like materials. The bills 
for those repairs were: Gordon Hellstrom, $2,031.82; Butterfield 
Lumber, $366.42; Fred Burns, $4,142.30; Perschon, $113.99; and 
Perschon, $1,472.01. 
(c) Standard left behind damaged light fixtures 
requiring repair of 34 lamp holders, replacement of 120 lamps and 
other repairs by Willard Hellstrom totalling $1,135.26. 
(d) The above repairs totalled $9,852.66 which 
English substantially paid on or before December 31, 1988. See 
R. at 196-97 (Findings of Fact, 11 42). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is not clear from Standard's Brief of Appellant 
("Appellant's Brief") which findings of fact and conclusions of 
law Standard challenges an appeal. Standard appears to argue 
that the lower court should have entered a conclusion of law that 
the parties1 agreement to reduce the rent from $1,200 to $1,000 
per month for the third 36-month period of the lease term is 
unenforceable as a matter of law because the writings that dis-
cuss it are insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. How-
ever, admissions of the rent agreement made by Standard in its 
pleadings and at trial bar Standard from interposing the statute 
of frauds as a shield to liability. Even if the statute of 
frauds were to apply, the statute is satisfied by the Lease, the 
rent checks and check stubs written by Standard, and the parties' 
written correspondence, together with the parties1 trial testi-
mony that they had agreed on a rent amount. 
Standard claims that English unlawfully evicted Stan-
dard when English changed the lock to the Leased Premises. How-
ever, English did not enter the premises or change the lock until 
after Standard had moved out of the premises and directed English 
to obtain a subtenant. Standard's instruction to obtain a 
subtenant effectively authorized English to enter the premises to 
repair them so that they could be shown to prospective tenants. 
-12-
Furthermore, the lower court found that English's actions never 
deprived Standard of access to the Leased Premises; that each 
time Standard sought access, it was achieved; that English 
changed the lock for the purpose of protecting the workmen's 
tools; and that Standard was given a key to the new lock, all 
findings which are unchallenged by Standard on appeal. 
Finally, Standard contends that English is not entitled 
to recover the amounts he expended in repairing and refurbishing 
the premises on the grounds that there was no evidence adduced at 
trial of the condition of the premises at the commencement of the 
lease term. On the contrary, the Lease itself, executed by Stan-
dard, recites in three different places that the Leased Premises 
were in a condition of "good" and/or f,excellentn repair. More-
over, having been directed by Standard to obtain a subtenant and 
with Standard being in breach of its rent agreement, English had 
a duty to mitigate the damages caused by the accruing unpaid 
rent. The leading case of Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Com-
pany, 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989), mandates that landlords take com-
mercially reasonable steps to relet premises and authorizes 
recovery of the reasonable costs of repairs and refurbishing 
incurred in reletting the premises. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Standard has not specifically identified which findings 
of fact it challenges on appeal. A review of Standard's Appel-
lant's Brief suggests that Standard has not expressly assigned 
err to any of the findings. To the extent that any of Standard's 
arguments impliedly contests any of the trial court's findings of 
fact, those findings shall not be set aside on appeal, unless 
Standard satisfies the requirements of Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Governing findings entered by the trial court, Rule 52, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states in part as follows: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a finding is "clearly 
erroneous" only where it is "against the clear weight of the evi-
dence" or where the appellate court otherwise reaches "a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Special Service District 1 
v. Jackson Cattle, 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987). A trail 
court's findings should be affirmed where they are supported by 
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substantial evidence. See Jackson Cattle, 744 P.2d at 1377. The 
Utah Supreme Court, quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 2585 (1971), has stated: 
"The appellate court. . .does not consider 
and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere 
fact that on the same evidence the appellate 
court might have reached a different result 
does not justify it in setting the findings 
aside. It may regard a finding as clearly 
erroneous only if the finding is without ade-
quate evidentiary support or induced by an 
erroneous view of the law." 
Walker, 743 P. 2d at 193 (emphasis added). In Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989), the court 
explained that for an appellant to challenge a trial court's 
findings of fact, the appellant: 
must first marshal all the evidence support-
ing the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support 
the findings even viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the court below. 
Reid, 776 P.2d at 899. 
In its appeal, Standard also has not directly chal-
lenged any of trail court's conclusions of law or at least has 
not identified which conclusions it contends are erroneous. Nev-
ertheless, this Court is not bound by the lower court's conclu-
sions of law and reviews them for correctness. City of West Jor-
dan v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1988). 
A trail court's conclusions of law, if correct, will be affirmed 
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on any grounds even if they are different from those stated by 
the trial court. See Foss Lewis & Sons Construction Co. v. Gen-
eral Insurance Co. of America, 517 P.2d 539, 540 (Utah 1973). 
II. STANDARD'S ADMISSION OF THE RENT AGREEMENT IN ITS PLEADINGS 
AND AT TRIAL BARS STANDARD FROM RELYING ON THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS AS A DEFENSE TO LIABILITY. 
Standard seeks to use the statute of frauds to shield 
itself from liability for the lease payments which accrued after 
September 1, 1988. Standard argues that the writings that dis-
cuss the parties1 agreement to pay $lf000 rent are insufficient 
to satisfy that statute of frauds. Historically, the statute of 
frauds was designed to protect property owners from the ficti-
tious claims of supposed transferees. However, the underlying 
purpose of the statute of frauds is satisfied where both parties 
admit the terms of the alleged oral agreement. Failure to 
enforce an agreement under these circumstances would result in 
the same injustice the statute of frauds is intended to prevent. 
Consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute 
is the rule that a party who seeks to avoid enforcement of an 
oral agreement waives its right to rely on the statute of frauds 
1
 Utahfs statute of frauds relating to leases and contracts 
for interest in lands, Utah Code Ann. S 25-5-3 (1989), provides 
as follows: "Every contract for the leasing for a longer period 
than one year . . . shall be void unless the contract, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
by whom the lease . . . is to be made. . . .n 
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as a defense to the agreement where that party has admitted the 
terms of the agreement. The Utah Supreme Court recognized this 
rule in Bentlev v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984). 
In Bentlev, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant 
had orally agreed to guarantee a corporation's obligation to pur-
chase a truck from the plaintiffs. At trial, the defendant 
admitted that at the time he signed the bill of sale for the 
truck on behalf of the corporate buyer, he intended and under-
stood that he was a guarantor of the debt. 
In determining whether the defendant should be held to 
his oral promise to guarantee the debt, the court stated: 
The statute of frauds is a defense that can 
be waived by . . . admitting its existence in 
the pleadings [citations omitted]; or admit-
ting at trial the existence and all essential 
terms of the contract [citations omitted]. 
Bentley, 694 P.2d at 621. On the basis of the defendant's 
in-court admission, the Court in Bentley held that the defendant 
had waived the statute of frauds as a defense and accordingly was 
bound by his promise to guarantee the debt despite the fact that 
it was not in writing as required by the statute of frauds. Id. 
The court reasoned as follows: 
Since a purpose of the statute of frauds is 
to prevent fraud and perjury on the part of 
one claiming that another had guaranteed a 
debt, the one opposing the claim cannot com-
plain if he admits the existence of the guar-
antee. [Citations omitted.] "It cannot give 
a court any great satisfaction to permit a 
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defendant to escape from performing a con-
tract he admits he has made." 2 Corbin on 
Contracts S 320 at 153 (1950). 
id. 
In the instant case, Standard has admitted the exist-
ence of an oral agreement for lease payments of $1,000 per month 
both in its pleadings and at trial. In its Trial Brief, dated 
December 15, 1989, Standard asserts in paragraph 22 of the State-
ment of Facts as follows: 
22. On or about November 2, 1988, 
Stephen Schubach called Dr. English at his 
home and proposed that Standard Optical pay 
$1,000 a month for the Premises. 
R. at 94. The trial testimony of Stephen Schubach, President of 
Standard, confirms the statement made by Standard in its Trial 
Brief. Schubach testified at trial that during the conversation 
which took place on or about November 2f 1988, he agreed to pay 
$1,000. See Transcript, Vol. II, p. 194, line 20-22. Further 
confirming Schubach's testimony, English testified at trial that 
Schubach called English at his home on or about November 2, 1988, 
and agreed to $1,000 as the rental figure. See Transcript, Vol. 
I, pp. 139-40. 
While Standard admits in its Trial Brief and Schubach 
testified at trial that Schubach called English and agreed to 
$1,000 per month as rent, Standard suggests in its brief that the 
agreement to pay $1,000 per month rent may have been an agreement 
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only for the period until a new tenant was obtained. See Appel-
lant's Brief at 19. There is, however, a complete absence of 
support in the record for the assertion that the agreement to pay 
$1,000 per month rent occurred in any context other than an 
agreement to pay $1,000 per month for the third 36-month period 
of the Lease. At no place in his deposition or trial testimony 
did Schubach assert that Standard's agreement to pay $1,000 per 
month rent was not in the context of the negotiations for a rent 
amount under the lease. At no place in his deposition or trial 
testimony did Schubach assert that the agreement to pay $1,000 
per month rent was in the context of a settlement. 
Moreover, the trial court found that Standard agreed to 
pay $1,000 per month for the premises. Standard has not chal-
lenged and this Court must accept that finding. Additionally, 
and as discussed below in Argument III, the parties' trial testi-
mony regarding their negotiations and the parties' correspondence 
during those negotiations establish that the agreement to pay 
2
 While the evidence establishes that the agreement to pay 
$1,000 per month rent was for the third 36-month period of the 
lease term, it should be noted that the damages awarded by the 
trial court equal the amount suggested by Standard, i.e., $7,400 
which represents the amount of unpaid rent which accrued prior to 
the date English leased the premises to another tenant (appr 
mately seven and one-half months). 
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$1,000 per month rent related to the third 36-month period of the 
lease term. 
III. THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT THE STAT-
UTE OF FRAUDS BARS RECOVERY. 
A. The Cases Cited by Standard do not Govern the Facts of 
This Case. 
In its brief, Standard cites a number of cases for the 
proposition that leases providing for the negotiation of rent 
with no specified method of determining the amount are unenforce-
able. Each case cited by Standard is distinguishable in that 
none of the parties involved in those cases actually agreed on a 
rent amount and made payments pursuant to that agreement. 
Accordingly, those cases do not govern. However, because Stan-
dard places special emphasis on Pinqree v. Continental Group of 
Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1976), it is useful examine that 
case for its applicability to the case at bar. 
Pinqree involves a lease which expressly granted the 
tenant two options to renew for two five-year terms upon the same 
terms and conditions as the original lease, except that the 
rental amount would be renegotiated. As pointed out by Standard 
in its brief, the parties were unable to agree upon a rent amount 
for the renewal period. Pinqree, 558 P.2d at 1321. Because the 
parties could not agree on a rent, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Pinqree refused to fix a reasonable rent. id. Standard contends 
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that Pinqree governs the facts of this case and requires the con-
clusion that the Lease is not enforceable because the parties 
failed to agree on a rent amount after September 1, 1988. 
Standard's analysis of Pinqree entirely disregards the 
trial court's finding of fact, unchallenged on appeal, that 
English and Standard did agree on a rent amount. See R. at 194 
(Finding of Fact, 1f 28). Standard also disregards the undisputed 
fact that the parties' agreement for a $1,000 per month rent 
amount was memorialized by Trial Exhibits 17 and 18, Standard's 
two written rent checks, and Trial Exhibit 13, English's signed 
letter. Accordingly, Pinqree and the other cases cited by Stan-
dard relating to options to renew where the parties fail to agree 
on a rent amount are inapposite. 
B. The Parties' Writings and Parol Evidence Satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The Utah statute of frauds requires that a lease with a 
duration of more than one year must have some memorandum thereof, 
in writing and signed by the party by whom the lease is to be 
made. Utah Code Ann. S 25-5-3. It is well established that the 
writing necessary to satisfy the statute of frauds need not con-
tain all of the terms and conditions of the agreement, but rather 
may be comprised of several memoranda which, taken together, 
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contain the terms of the agreement. 72 Am.Jur. 2d, Statute of 
Frauds, S 371; In re Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548, 549 (Utah 
1979). 
In the instant case, the parties1 agreement on a rent 
amount for the third 36-month period of the lease term is memori-
alized by the Lease (Trial Exhibit 4); the October 20, 1988, rent 
check written by Standard (Trial Exhibit 17); and the December 1, 
1988, rent check written by Standard (Trial Exhibit 18). Stan-
dard argues that because English, the party to be charged, did 
not sign the checks, they cannot be considered as satisfying the 
writing requirement of the statute of frauds. However, it is 
well established that not all of the writings memorializing an 
agreement need to be signed by the parties to be charged. 
Greqerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 372-73 (Utah 1980); 72 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds, S 371. While English did not sign 
the two checks when he deposited them into his bank, it is undis-
puted that he did sign the 1982 Lease. 
Though Standard further contends that the checks do not 
contain references to the rental term, express words of reference 
3
 Standard's assertion in its brief that "The only way the 
Lease Agreement could be enforced after August 1988 was if the 
parties entered into a written addendum to the lease specifying 
the amount of rent. . .," unsupported by any case authority, is 
patently inaccurate. Appellant's Brief at 14. 
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are not required to sufficiently connect a signed writing to an 
unsigned writing, 2 Corbin on Contracts, S 514 (1963). However, 
where signed and unsigned writings are relied on to satisfy the 
statute of frauds, there must be some "nexus" between the writ-
ings. Greqerson, 617 P.2d at 373. According to the Utah Supreme 
Court, this "nexus" may be shown by: 
express reference in the signed writing to 
the unsigned one, or by implied reference 
gleamed from the contents of the writings and 
the circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion. In the latter instance, parol evidence 
may be used to connect an unsigned document 
to one that has been signed by the persons to 
be charged. 
Id. In the instant case, the parties' written correspondence 
from July, 1988, through November, 1988, and the parties1 trial 
testimony regarding their negotiations during that period, estab-
lish that the October 20, 1988, and December 1, 1988, rent checks 
written by Standard referred to the Lease and memorialized the 
rent amount for the third 36-month period under the lease term. 
The Lease provides for all of the terms of the parties' 
agreement (e.g., ten year lease term, description of premises, 
payment of maintenance expenses, taxes and insurance), except the 
amount of the monthly lease payment after September 1, 1988, 
which was to be negotiated pursuant to paragraph (c) of the 
Lease. Standard's two checks sent to English indicating payment 
for September, October and part of November's lease payments 
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memorialize the parties1 agreement that the amount of the monthly 
lease payment after September 1, 1988, would be reduced from 
$1,200 to $1,000. Significantly, Standard did not send English 
the first post-September 1, 1988, rent check, with the check stub 
notations indicating a $1000 rent amount until November 21, 1988, 
approximately three weeks after Schubach had called English at 
his home and agreed on a rent amount of $1,000. Thereafter, 
Standard sent another check also in the sum of $1,000. The rent 
checks, both paid after Standard had agreed to pay $1,000 per 
month rent, together with the Lease contain all the material 
terms of the parties1 agreement and thereby satisfy the statute 
of frauds. 
The parties' written correspondence from July, 1988, 
through November, 1988, together with the parties' oral negotia-
tions and the circumstances of those negotiations establish the 
requisite nexus between the rent checks and the Lease. 
Prior to June, 1988, Standard understood that the Lease 
expired at the end of August, 1988, with an option to negotiate a 
renewal of the lease. However, in a conversation on June 20, 
1988, English informed Standard that the lease did not expire in 
1988 and referred Standard to the Lease. The course of the par-
ties' subsequent communications establishes that the parties were 
negotiating with reference to the amount of monthly lease 
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payments due under the Lease for the third 36 month period after 
September 1, 1988. 
Memorializing an earlier conversation, English's 
July 5, 1988, letter states: 
Also, as we discussed, we will negotiate 
a new monthly lease amount around the 15th of 
September, as per the lease agreement. 
Trial Exhibit 5 (emphasis added). 
In his responding letter dated July 20, 1988 (Trial 
Exhibit 6), Standard did not dispute English's statement that the 
parties would negotiate for a new monthly rent "as per the lease 
agreement." Additionally, Standard expressed a continued inter-
est in "subletting]" the premises and suggested "an outright 
buyout of the lease." Standard's suggestion that it "sublet" the 
premises indicates that it understood that even though it had 
vacated the premises, it continued to be bound under the lease. 
Moreover, Standard's reference to a "buy out of the lease" indi-
cates that it understood that there must have been some lease 
term to buyout which extended beyond September 1, 1988. 
English's July 22, 1988 letter (Trial Exhibit 7) con-
firms the conclusion that the parties were negotiating in refer-
ence to the Lease and not with regard to a month to month tenancy 
or a settlement agreement. In that letter, English responds to 
Standard's suggestion that the premises be sublet by stating that 
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his approval of a subtenant would not be "unreasonably withheld/' 
language which echoes language contained in the Lease, 
Standard's next correspondence dated August 1, 1988 
(Trial Exhibit 8), states that in September Standard would be 
negotiating for an $800 per month "lease amount." Standard also 
proposed, as it had before, a "simple buyout of our lease." Both 
statements indicate that Standard was negotiating with reference 
to the Lease and that it understood that the lease term extended 
beyond September 1, 1988. 
In his next letter to Standard dated September 13, 1988 
(Trial Exhibit 9), English expressed an interest in a meeting to 
"discuss the lease negotiations" (emphasis added). 
In a letter dated October 5, 1988 (Trial Exhibit 11), 
English recounts the parties' inability to arrive at an "accept-
able negotiated monthly lease payment for the remaining four 
[sic] year period of [Standard's] lease . . ." English's lan-
guage communicates his understanding that the parties were nego-
tiating with reference to the 36-month period of the lease term 
beginning after September 1, 1988. 
On or about October 20, 1988, Standard sent a check to 
English for $1,600. (Trial Exhibit 16). The check stub indi-
cated $800 for September's rent and $800 for October's. English 
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subsequently returned the check because the parties had not yet 
agreed on an amount. 
Thereafter, Schubach called English at his home and 
agreed to $1,000 per month as the rental amount. Approximately 
three weeks after Schubach1s call to English, English received 
the same $1,600 check he had previously received and sent back to 
Standard, except that the notations on the check stub had been 
changed to indicate a $1,000 rent payment for September and a 
partial rent payment of $600 for the month of October. (Trial 
Exhibit 17). On the same date, November 21, 1988, Standard paid 
Utah Power & Light bills for electricity supplied to the premises 
through October 18, 1988. 
On December 5, 1988, English received from Standard a 
rent check in the sum of $1,000. On the next day, December 6, 
1988, Standard paid Utah Power & Light bills for electricity sup-
plied to the premises through November 18, 1988. 
Standard's statements and conduct over a six-month 
period of negotiations with English establish that Standard's 
agreement to pay $1,000 per month rent was with reference to the 
third 36-month period of the Lease. Specifically, the parties' 
references to "lease payments" and "lease negotiations," to 
"subletting" the premises and to a possible "buyout of the lease" 
evidence that Standard understood that it was negotiating with 
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reference to the Lease and that it was bound under the Lease 
beyond September lf 1988. 
Moreover, there is an absence of support in the record 
for the assertion that the agreement to pay $1,000 per month rent 
occurred in any context other than an agreement to pay $1,000 per 
month for the third 36-month period of the 1982 Lease. At no 
place in his deposition or trial testimony did Schubach assert 
that Standard's agreement to pay $1,000 per month rent was not in 
the context of the negotiations for a rent amount under the 
lease. Additionally, Standard has pointed to no testimony of 
any of the witnesses who testified at trial as support for the 
conclusion that the parties were negotiating for a settlement. 
The written Lease, the parties1 rent agreement, the written 
checks paid pursuant to the agreement and the parties' oral nego-
tiations and correspondence amply satisfy the statute of frauds. 
Use of the statute of frauds in this case to shield Standard from 
liability for a contractual obligation would promote the injus-
tice the statute is intended to prevent. 
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IV. ENGLISH1 S ENTRANCE ONTO THE PREMISES DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE LEASE. 
In its brief, Standard argues that English breached the 
Lease by unlawfully depriving Standard of possession of the pre-
mises and that English's repossession precludes him from recover-
ing under the Lease. The assertion that English deprived Stan-
dard of possession is unfounded. Standard voluntarily chose not 
to occupy the building. Having found what it deemed to be a more 
desirable location, Standard voluntarily vacated the premises, 
leaving signs announcing the move. After considering all of the 
evidence, including the creditability and demeanor of the wit-
nesses, the trial court entered findings of fact that English's 
actions did not deprive Standard of access to the premises; that 
each time Standard sought access to the premises, access was 
achieved; that Standard was never denied access to the premises; 
and that Standard was given a key to the premises. Despite the 
fact that Standard has not challenged any of these findings, 
Standard apparently requests this Court to rule that Standard was 
unlawfully deprived of possession as a matter of law. The single 
act upon which Standard relies as supporting its position that 
Standard was unlawfully deprived of possession is English's 
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change of the lock on October 18, 1988. Standard relies on Bass 
v. Planned Management Services, 761 P.2d 566 (Utah 1988), and 
Aldrich v. Olson, 531 P.2d 825 (Wash. App. 1975), for the propo-
sition that a landlord unlawfully deprives a tenant of possession 
when the landlord changes the locks. Both cases are distinguish-
able from the facts of this case. 
Aldrich v. Olson, 531 P.2d 825 (Wash. App. 1975) 
involved a residential landlord/tenant dispute in which the 
plaintiff/landlord sought recovery of unpaid rent for the balance 
of a lease term. The defendant/tenant denied liability on the 
grounds that there was no default under the lease and further 
sought damages resulting from the landlord's alleged eviction. 
After not receiving a rent payment, the landlord had entered the 
premises with a key she had retained and discovered rotten food 
and that some of the tenant's property was missing, after which 
she changed the locks. Several days later, the tenant returned, 
broke one of the locks, reentered the premises and removed the 
rest of his property, together with some furnishings which he had 
installed under the terms of the lease. 
4
 There is no evidence in the record that Standard raised the 
issue of lack of possession or access with English until Standard 
filed its Answer to the Complaint. 
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Affirming the trial court's decision in favor of the 
tenant, the appellate court found that the tenant had not aban-
doned the premises and that the landlord's change of the locks 
constituted an unlawful eviction. Aldrichr 531 P.2d at 827. In 
discussing the significance of the landlord's actions, the court 
stated: 
It is difficult to visualize an act of a 
landlord more specifically intended as a 
reassumption of possession by the landlord 
and a permanent deprivation of the tenant's 
possession than a "lockout" without the ten-
ant's knowledge or permission [emphasis 
added]. Consequently, the real issue on 
appeal is whether or not changing the locks 
was an unlawful [original emphasis] act by 
the landlord. 
Id. The court's language indicates that where the tenant has 
knowledge of the landlord's change of the locks or where the ten-
ant has given the landlord permission to change the locks, the 
landlord's act of changing the locks might not be considered 
unlawful. 
In the instant case, Standard effectively gave English 
permission to change the lock. In the parties' September 26, 
1988, meeting, Standard declared that it was not in the leasing 
business and that it was English who was in the leasing business. 
The trial court found that English left the meeting with the 
understanding that English was responsible for obtaining a tenant 
for the unoccupied premises while the parties continued to 
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negotiate a lease amount. Standard's instruction to obtain a 
tenant for the premises necessarily implied that, at the very 
least, English could take those measures reasonably necessary to 
obtain a tenant, including repairing the premises and showing 
them to prospective tenants. The trial court found that English 
changed the lock for the purpose of protecting the tools of the 
workmen who English had hired to repair the premises. Moreover, 
the trial court found that English's actions did not deprive 
Standard of access to the premises; that each time Standard 
sought access to the premises, access was achieved; that Standard 
was never denied access to the premises; and that Standard was 
given a key to the premises. Standard has not challenged any of 
these findings. 
Not only does Standard's authorization of English to 
find a subtenant distinguish this case from the facts of Aldrich, 
Standard's authorization also operates to bar Standard, under 
principles of waiver and estoppel, from asserting that English's 
change of the lock constituted an unlawful eviction. To evoke 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a party (the "first party") 
must show that another party made a statement inconsistent with a 
claim later asserted by that party; that the first party acted in 
reliance on the statement; and that the first party would be 
injured if the second were allowed to contradict or repudiate its 
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statement. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commis-
sion, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). Under the doctrine of 
waiver, a party must knowingly and intentionally relinquish a 
right. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 578 
(Utah 1985). 
In this case, Standard made the statement that it would 
not continue to seek subtenants for the premises and that finding 
a tenant was English's business. English concluded from Stan-
dard's statement that it was his responsibility to obtain a ten-
ant. To comply with Standard's instruction, English employed 
workmen to repair the damage done by Standard to the premises. 
For the purpose of protecting the workmen's tools, English 
changed the lock. Standard now argues that English's action 
unlawfully deprived it of possession, despite the facts that 
Standard effectively gave English permission to enter the pre-
mises and that Standard was never deprived of possession of the 
premises. Accordingly, Standard is estopped to claim that 
English's change of the lock constitutes an unlawful eviction. 
Similarly, Standard's instruction to English to obtain a 
subtenant constitutes a knowing and intentional relinquishment of 
Standard's right to exclusively enter the premise. 
Standard also relies on Bass v. Planned Management Ser-
vices, 761 P.2d 566 (Utah 1988), to support its claim that 
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English unlawfully deprived Standard of possession of the pre-
mises • In Bass, two of the defendants, the Trimbles, leased a 
mobile home to the plaintiffs, the Basses, who moved the mobile 
home to a park managed by defendant Planned Management Services, 
Inc. ("PMS"). After the Basses defaulted on their payments for 
the mobile home, the Basses employed a real estate agent to sell 
the mobile home and moved out some time around October 20, 1978, 
ten days before the expiration of the lease on October 31, 1978. 
Thereafter, PMS changed the locks on the mobile home and sold it 
to another party. The trial court held PMS liable for trespass 
in the amount of $76.70, the reasonable rental value of the 
mobile for the ten day period of the trespass. 
Conceding that it changed the lock prior to the expira-
tion of the lease term, PMS asserted on appeal that the Basses 
were not actually denied access to the home or that any demand to 
enter after the locks were changed had been made. In affirming 
the trial court's finding, the appellate court emphasized that 
the result of PMS's actions was to actually deny access to Bass-
es1 real estate agent and that the Basses were also, in fact, 
denied access to the park on at least one occasion. Bass, 761 
P.2d at 569. 
While the court in Bass expressly found that the ten-
ants had been denied access, the trial court in this case 
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expressly found that English's actions never deprived Standard of 
access to the premises* 
Additionally, unlike the facts of this case, the tenant 
in Bass did not authorize the landlord to enter the premises. 
Standard's direction to obtain a subtenant for the Leased Pre-
mises, necessarily implied that, at the very least, English could 
enter the premises to perform repairs necessary to rerent the 
premises and to show the premises to prospective tenants. 
Indeed, the trial court found that English changed the lock to 
the premises "for the purpose of protecting the tools of the 
repairman who would be working on the premises." In view of the 
trial court's findings of fact, unchallenged an appeal, there is 
an insufficient basis to conclude that English's entrance onto 
the premises was unlawful. 
V. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
JUDGMENT AGAINST STANDARD FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM STAN-
DARD'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE PREMISES. 
Pursuant to the Lease, Standard agreed to at all times 
maintain the premises in a condition of good repair. In its 
findings of fact, the trial court found that Standard failed to 
maintain the premises. See R. at 196-97 (Findings of Fact, 11 
39-42). In its conclusions of law, the trial court concluded 
that Standard breached the lease by failing to maintain and 
repair the premises and awarded damages on that basis. See R. at 
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198 (Conclusions of Law, 11 3). Asserting that English presented 
no evidence "whatsoever" of the condition of the premises at the 
commencement of the Lease, Standard argues that there was insuf-
ficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that Standard 
5 breached its obligations. In making its argument, Standard 
entirely overlooks the language of the Lease which unequivocally 
establishes that the premises were in "good" and/or "excellent" 
repair at the beginning of the lease term. When it executed the 
lease in 1982, Standard agreed, in three different places in the 
lease, to accept the premises in "good" and/or "excellent" 
condition: 
It is mutually understood and agreed that the 
premises herein leased are in a condition of 
excellent repair. . . . 
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 2. 
The lessee does hereby accepted the Leased 
Premises in a condition of good repair . . . 
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 2. 
The lessee does hereby agree to accept the 
demised premises in a state of good repair 
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 3. 
5
 As stated above, to successfully challenge any of the 
findings, Standard must demonstrate that the finding is "clearly 
erroneous" and "against the clear weight of the evidence." State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
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Accordingly, Standard was obligated under the Lease to 
return the premises to English in at least a condition of good 
repair. The trial court found, however, that the premises were 
not only in a state of disrepair but had been badly damaged. 
Standard removed attachments and cabinets and counters, leaving 
gouges in the ceiling, holes in the walls and gaps in the floor 
trip. Many of the light fixtures were not working. There was 
also damage to the bathroom walls, cabinets and floor tiles. The 
furnace had not been maintained and was not working properly. 
Furthermore, Standard has pointed to no evidence suggesting that 
when Standard vacated the premises, the premises were in the 
same, or better, condition than the beginning of the lease term. 
Standard has failed to demonstrate that any of the trial court's 
findings of fact relating to the damaged condition of the pre-
mises are clearly erroneous or that the conclusion of law relat-
ing to English's damages for repair costs is incorrect as a mat-
ter of law. 
VI. ENGLISH IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED ON 
APPEAL. 
In Management Services Corp. v. Development Assoc, 617 
P.2d (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held that where a con-
tract provides for the payment of attorney's fees incurred in 
enforcing the contract, the prevailing party may recover both 
attorney's fees incurred at the trial level and those incurred on 
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appeal. Management Services, 617 P. 2d at 409; see also Jenkins 
v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1984); G.G.A., Inc. v. 
Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 846-47 (Utah App. 1989). The Lease in 
the instant case provides for attorneys fees and costs incurred 
in enforcing the lease and was relied on by the trial court to 
award English fees and costs incurred at the trial level. 
Accordingly, respondent respectfully requests that in the event 
this Court affirms the trial court's decision, the case be 
remanded to the trial court for a determination of the attorney's 
fees incurred by English on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the trial court's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered below and remand 
the case to the trial court for a determination of the attorney's 
fees incurred by English on appeal. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1990. 
ARY E. DOCTORMAN 
ELIZABETH S. WHITi 
of and for / 
PARSONS BEHLE & ^ faSTIMER 
Attorneys for Plaint iff/Respondent 
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10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
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//ELIZABETH S. WHITNJ 
L/ of and for 
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ADDENDA 
r 
T,'..TC 
F
- S 1C9Q 
GARY E. DOCTORMAN (0895) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
W. DANIEL ENGLISH, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah ) 
corporation, ) Civil No. 89-0900580CN 
Defendant. ) Judge Michael R. Murphy 
* * * * * * * * 
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Judge 
Michael R. Murphy on December 21, 1989 and continued into Decem-
ber 22, 1989. Plaintiff, W. Daniel English ("Dr. English") 
appeared in person and through his attorney, Gary E. Doctorman of 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer and defendant Standard Optical Company 
("Standard Optical") appeared through its president, Stephen 
Schubach and its general manager, Klaus Rathke, and through their 
attorneys, George Hunt and Kurt Frankenberg of Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau. The court having heard the testimony of the wit-
nesses called by the plaintiff, Fred Burns, Gordon Helstrom, 
00X83 
Willard Helstrom, Dr. English and Nikkie Dore and the witnesses 
called by the defendants, Stephen Schubach and Klaus Rathke, and 
pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court 
makes the following findings of fact. 
1. On August 10, 1982, Dr. English and Standard 
Optical entered into a written Lease Agreement for the lease of 
commercial real property and a building located at 3525 Market 
Street, West Valley City, Utah. 
2. The significant portions of the signed written 
Lease in controversy are described below: 
(a) To have and to hold said premises 
and office space under the terms of this 
agreement for a term of ten (10) years 
beginning on the first day of the month 
following written notice to lessee from 
lessor and terminating at midnight on the 
last day of the same month 10 years hence 
[i.e. 1992]. 
(b) The Lessee does hereby uncondition-
ally agree to pay as rent for the demised 
premises and to lessor, or order, at West 
Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah, the sum 
of $1,000 each month for 36 months with the 
first such installment to be due and payable 
on or before the first day of September, 
1982, and each installment payment to be due 
thereafter on or before the same calendar day 
during the term of the Agreement. A grace 
period of five days is given for the making 
of such installment payment. 
(c) The monthly rent specified in the 
section above shall be negotiated every 36 
months. 
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(d) It is mutually understood and 
agreed by these parties that the demised 
premises herein will be used by the lessee as 
a retail optical business and lessee does 
hereby agree to use said premises for no 
other purpose without the written consent of 
lessor first had and obtained. However, such 
consent will not be unreasonably withheld. 
(e) It is mutually understood and 
agreed that the premises herein leased are in 
a condition of excellent repair . . . . 
(f) The Lessee does hereby agree to at 
all times during the term of this agreement 
keep the heating and air conditioning units 
in a condition of good repair. 
(g) The Lessee hereby accepts the 
leased premises in a condition of good repair 
and does hereby agree to at all times during 
the term of this agreement to maintain the 
interior of the demised premises and to keep 
the same in a condition of good repair at all 
times, and agrees not to make any alterations 
to the demised premises without the written 
consent of the lessor first had and obtained, 
and then that all such alterations shall be 
made at the sole expense of the Lessee and 
that any such alterations as are then made a 
part of or attached to the building shall 
remain with the premises and become the 
property of the Lessor at the end of this 
lease term. 
(h) The Lessee does likewise agree to 
provide suitable floor covering (carpet, 
tile, etc) of his choice in said premises, to 
be responsible for all repairs done or needed 
to be done to the interior of the demised 
premises during the term of this agreement. 
(i) The Lessee does hereby agree to be 
responsible for all breakage to windows and 
doors in the demised premises and not to 
install any signs on the demised premises 
without the permissions of the Lessor. 
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(j) The Lessee shall not sublet any 
portion of the leased premises without the 
written consent of lessors first had and 
obtained. Nor shall the Lessee assign this 
lease in whole or in part without the written 
consent of the Lessors. . . . 
(k) It is agreed that the Lessor will 
not be liable to the lessee on account of any 
damage to any property of the Lessee in the 
demised premises on the count of lack of 
repairs to any equipment in the demised 
premises as is the responsibility of the 
Lessee to repair and maintain, and that the 
Lessor shall have the right to any reasonable 
inspection of the demised premises at any 
reasonable time during the term of this 
agreement. The Lessee does hereby agree to 
at all times keep the interior of the demised 
premises in a clean and sanitary condition in 
accordance with all good and reasonable 
standards of like commercial units. 
(1) It is mutually agreed that in the 
event of the failure, neglect or default of 
the Lessee to make payments herein provided, 
as they become due, or within the grace 
period, that the Lessor shall have the right 
and option to proceed under the terms of the 
following provisions or either of them: 
(m) To declare this agreement termi-
nated and proceed, with or without legal 
process to take possession of the demised 
premises and in which event this agreement 
will be terminated and each of the parties 
will be excused from any further performance 
of the terms and provisions herein set forth, 
or 
(n) To take any action necessary to 
evict the Lessee from the demised premises, 
and to proceed to make any and all necessary 
repairs to the property and to proceed to 
rent the same to any other person, and in the 
event it is necessary for Lessor to take a 
reduction of the rental rate on said demised 
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premises that the Lessee will pay the Lessor 
all expenses, in connection with such 
repairs, re-renting and any loss of rentals 
as may be determined by the rates set forth 
herein. In this respect it is agreed that 
time is of the essence of this agreement and 
that the terms and provisions herein set 
forth will extend to and become binding upon 
the respective heirs, executors, administra-
tors and assigns of these parties, and that 
the Lessee shall have no right to make any 
assignment of any rights under the terms of 
this agreement. 
(o) The Lessee does hereby agree to 
turn said premises back to the Lessor at the 
end of this lease term in as good a condition 
as the premises are at the commencement of 
this lease, with only ordinary wear and 
depreciation being accepted. 
(p) It is mutually agreed that in the 
event it becomes necessary for either party 
to enforce the terms of this agreement with 
court action, after default, that the party 
determined to be in default will pay to the 
opposite party all court costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. 
3. On or about September 1, 1985, plaintiff and 
defendant entered into a written addendum to the 1982 Rental 
Agreement specifying a monthly rent of $1,200 to be paid for the 
36-month period beginning on September 1, 1985. 
4. In 1986 and 1987, Standard Optical made the 
decision to convert their optical stores to "super stores" where 
possible and in early 1988 began negotiations with the Valley 
Fair Mall, one block away from the leased premises, and in June, 
1988, executed a lease with Valley Fair Mall for a super store. 
-5- 00150 
5. Prior to September, 1988, plaintiff had never 
experienced any problems with Standard Optical promptly paying 
rent. 
6. Prior to June 1988, Standard Optical understood 
the Rental Agreement term to expire at the end of August 1988, 
with an option to negotiate a renewal. 
7. On June 20, 1988, Klaus Rathke, General Manager of 
Standard Optical ("Rathke") told Dr. English that Standard 
Optical was moving to the Valley Fair Mall. Dr. English informed 
Mr. Rathke that the Lease term did not expire in 1988. Mr. 
Rathke expressed he thought the lease term was up and Dr. English 
referred him to the Lease. 
8. On or about June 30, 1988, Dr. English and Steven 
Schubach ("Schubach") discussed the leased premises and Schubach 
proposed to sublease the premises. Dr. English wrote back that 
he would consider a proposal and responded in writing as the 
Lease agreement required to consent of the Landlord. 
9. On July 1, 1988, Standard Optical promptly paid 
its July rent to Dr. English. 
10. On July 5, 1988, Dr. English requested that 
Standard Optical submit a list of proposed tenants for subletting 
the premises and suggested a meeting on September 15, 1988 to 
negotiate a new rental amount. 
-6-
00100 
11. July 17, 1988, was Standard Optical1s last day of 
business at the leased premises. 
12. On or about July 18, 1988, Standard Optical moved 
its records and inventory from the leased premises and also moved 
attachments to the building and built-in-cabinets and counters. 
Several large signs were placed on the premises stating Standard 
Optical had moved. Dr. English read the signs and concluded 
Standard Optical had moved. 
13. On July 20, 1988, Schubach wrote to Dr. English 
stating that Standard Optical had abandoned their plans to have a 
subsidiary of Standard Optical sublet the space but wanted to 
sublet it to someone else. 
14. On July 22, 1988, Dr. English wrote to Schubach 
stating that he needed to know more about the proposed subtenant 
before he could approve a subtenant. 
15. On August 1, 1988, Standard Optical promptly paid 
its rent for the month of August. 
16. Also on August 1, 1988, Mr. Schubach wrote to Dr. 
English indicating that Standard Optical intended to negotiate 
for an $800 per month Lease beginning September 1, 1988, and 
alternatively proposing a buy-out of $4,800 to be paid on Septem-
ber 15, 1988. 
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17. On September 26, 1988, Schubach, Rathke and Dr. 
English met to discuss the lease. Dr. English presented a 
document with rent comparables to Schubach. Schubach rejected 
the rent comparables. Schubach commented about rent in his Provo 
and Layton stores. Dr. English suggested if Standard wanted to 
sublease that they should consider calling Weight Watchers. 
Schubach stated "We're not in the leasing business, you are. Our 
business is the optical business." 
18. Schubach later said he would contact Rick Trentman 
of Weight Watchers. Dr. English left the September 26, 1988, 
meeting with the understanding that Standard Optical was not 
going to use the premises as a retail optical shop and that Dr. 
English, who was in the leasing business, should find a tenant 
and the parties would continue to negotiate the Lease amount. 
19. On September 29, 1988, in compliance with his 
understanding that he was to attempt to find a tenant, Dr. 
English had an access key made for the premises and upon entering 
the premises to inspect it he found damage to the Premises. 
20. On October 1, 1988, Standard Optical did not pay 
any rent. 
21. On October 5, 1988, Dr. English sent a notice of 
default to Standard Optical and suggested the parties use the 
same Lease amount until they agreed and that they use MAI 
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appraisers to determine the amount. Dr. English did this because 
he believed Schubach had used Standard Optical1s Provo and Layton 
stores as comparisons which Dr. English believed to be 
inappropriate. 
22. No subtenant was ever presented to Dr. English by 
Standard Optical. Further, Stephen Schubach called and left a 
message for Rick Trentman but never made contact directly with 
Rick Trentman of Weight Watchers. 
23. On October 18, 1988, Dr. English changed the lack 
to the premises for the purpose of protecting the tools of the 
repairmen who would be working on the premises. 
24. On October 20, 1988, Standard Optical issued a 
check in the amount of $1600: $800 for September and $800 for 
October rent. Schubach sent this amount because it was where 
Standard Optical left the negotiations. No mention was made that 
it was in response to a Demand Letter. 
25. On October 20, 1988, Dr. English's attorney, Gary 
Doctorman, wrote a letter to Richard and Stephen Schubach at 
Standard Optical Company. The letter informed Standard Optical 
that it was "in violation of the terms of the lease" and that if 
it desired to "remain in possession of the leased premises," it 
should make rent payments for the months of September and 
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October. The amount of rent claimed due was not specified in the 
letter. 
26. Dr. English subsequently returned the $1,600 check 
to Standard Optical because the parties had not yet arrived at an 
agreed amount. 
27. On November 1, 1988, no payment was made. 
28. In the first week of November, 1988, Schubach 
called Dr. English at his home and agreed that Standard Optical 
would pay $1,000 monthly rent. 
29. Each time Standard Optical sought access to the 
property after the locks were changed, access was achieved. 
30. On or about November 7, 1988, Dr. English's office 
gave the key to the premises to an employee of Standard Optical. 
31. On or about November 5 and November 7, Standard 
Optical employees entered into the Premises and removed the 
remaining Standard Optical possessions. 
32. Between September 1, 1988 and January 31, 1989, 
Standard Optical only attempted to enter the premises on November 
5, 1988 or November 7, 1988, and during the first half of Octo-
ber, 1988, on November 4, 1988 and on December 16, 1988. At no 
time that Standard Optical attempted to enter the Leased Pre-
mises were they denied access. Dr. English's actions never 
deprived Standard Optical of access to the premises. 
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33. Sometime between the last week of October and 
before November 10, 1988, subcontractors hired by Dr. English 
commenced repairs to the Premises. At that time Dr. English had 
not yet arranged for any particular tenant to lease the Premises. 
34. On November 21, 1988, Dr. English received $1,600 
in payment, the check markings indicated $1,000 of which was to 
be applied to the September rent and $600 to be applied to a 
partial payment for the October rent. 
35. On November 21, 1988, Standard Optical paid Utah 
Power & Light for electricity supplied to the premises at 3525 
Market Street up through October 18, 1988. 
36. On December 1, 1988, Standard Optical issued a 
check to Dr. English in the amount of $1,000. 
37. On December 2, 1988, Dr. English sent a demand 
letter to Mr. Rathke at Standard Optical requesting "lease 
payments due for October, November and December." In his letter, 
Dr. English also indicated that he had three prospective tenants 
for the premises. On December 5, 1988, Dr. English received a 
check from Standard Optical in the amount of $1,000. 
38. On December 6, 1988, Standard Optical paid Utah 
Power & Light for electricity supplied to the premises at 3525 
Market Street through November 18, 1988. 
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39. Defendant Standard Optical failed to maintain the 
premises at all times in a clean and sanitary condition in 
accordance with good and reasonable standards of like commercial 
units. 
40. Defendant Standard Optical removed attachments 
from the building. 
41. Defendant Standard Optical failed to keep the 
furnace in a reasonable state of repair. 
42. Dr. English and his contractors' inspection 
revealed the reasonable need to repair and Dr. English did repair 
at a reasonable cost as indicated as follows: 
(a) The furnace was not working properly and plumbing 
was damaged and Willard Hellstrom charged $619.86 for repairs. 
(b) It appeared that Standard Optical had removed 
numerous fixtures, including built-in-cabinets and counters. The 
removal left large and small holes in the walls, damaged the 
ceiling, walls, and carpets. Also, the removal of the built-in 
cabinets left gaps in the trim. Additionally, Standard had 
failed to fix a plumbing leak damaging the bathroom walls, 
cabinets and left the floor tiles curling. The damage to the 
walls, ceiling, bathroom trim was repaired with like materials. 
The bills for repairs were: Gordon Hellstrom, $2,031.82; 
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Butterfield Lumber, $366.42; Fred Burns, $4,143.30; Perschon, 
$113.99 and Perschon $1,472.01. 
(c) Standard Optical left behind damaged light fix-
tures requiring repair of 34 lampholders, replacement of 120 
lamps and other repairs by Willard Hellstrom totalling $1,135.26. 
(d) The above repairs totalled $9,852.66 and Dr. 
English substantially paid these amounts on or before December 
31, 1988. 
43. Dr. English mitigated his damages and re-rented 
the premises for a period of one year to Weight Watchers, Inc. at 
a sum of $990.00 per month commencing the 1st day of July, 1989. 
44. Standard Optical refused to pay rent of $1,400 for 
the rent due in 1988 and has paid no rent in the year 1989. 
45. Reasonable attorneys1 fees of $11,968.40 were 
incurred by plaintiff, and plaintiff's expenses and filing fees 
of $75.00, service of process fees of $9.75 and deposition costs 
of $453.45. 
THE COURT HAVING MADE THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT hereby 
enters its Conclusions of Law: 
1. Pursuant to the terms of the written Lease, the 
parties negotiated at the end of the second 36-month term and on 
or about November 2, 1988 the parties agreed that the rent for 
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the next 36-month term from September 1, 1988 to August 1, 1991 
would be $1,000 per month. 
2. Standard Optical failed to pay the rent as agreed 
and breached the written Lease. Dr. English has been damaged in 
the amount of lost rent for the year 1988 in the amount of $1,400 
and for lost rent from January 1, 1989 through the 1st day of 
July, 1990 in the amount of $6,000. Plaintiff is entitled to the 
entry of judgment of these amounts. 
3. Standard Optical breached the written Lease 
Agreement between the parties as they failed to maintain and 
repair the premises, including the furnace, and they removed 
attachments to the building and as a result of their failure to 
maintain and repair, Dr. English reasonably repaired the premises 
at a reasonable cost of $9,852.66. 
4. Dr. English incurred reasonable attorneys' fees in 
the amount of $11,968.40 and is entitled to a judgment for that 
amount. 
5. Dr. English is entitled to prejudgment interest on 
the damages and lost rent at the rate of 10%. 
6. Dr. English incurred court costs in the amount of 
$538.20 and is entitled to a judgment for that amount. 
7. Interest shall accrue on the judgment at the rate 
of 12% from the date of the judgment. 
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8. Plaintiffs failed to meet its burden of proof to 
show defendants failed to negotiate in good faith. 
9. Pursuant to the decision in Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Company. 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (1989), this court 
will impose damage awards based on past events only and does not 
take into account the landlord's mitigation efforts in the future 
and therefore this court retains jurisdiction of this matter and 
awards only those rents that have come due as of the time of the 
trial, which judgment will be immediately enforceable. The rertts 
and damages accruing after the trial may be recovered through 
supplemental proceedings for any further rents lost or damages 
incurred imposing the duty upon the landlord to fulfill its 
ongoing duty to mitigate. The initial determination of the 
tenant's liability would govern in the supplemental proceeding. 
DATED this f day of V£/M/JJTAU , 19^. 1AU 
flua^M / j/t 
JUDGE MICHAEL R. MURP 
Approved as to form: 
George A. Hunt 
Attorney for Defendant 
Standard Optical Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to George A. Hunt, Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 on this £>\ day of January, 1990:"-\ 
384:010290A 
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GARY E. DOCTORMAN (0895) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
W. DANIEL ENGLISH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
<3/5<44CT 
Civil No. 89-0900580CN 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
* * * * * * * * 
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Michael 
R. Murphy and the trial was concluded on December 22, 1989. The 
court having entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and the court being fully informed and good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
That plaintiff, Daniel W. English is hereby granted 
judgment against defendant, Standard Optical, a Utah corporation 
as follows: $17,252.66 in principal, prejudgment interest in the 
amount of § 1,355.27, attorneys1 fees in the amount of $ 
11,968.40, costs of court in the amount of $ 538.20. Interest 
shall accrue on this judgment at the rate of 12% from the date 
hereof until paid. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this judgment shall be 
augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees 
expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as 
shall be established by Affidavit. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this judgment is enforceable 
immediately. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court retains jurisdic-
tion of this matter and awards only those damages and rents that 
have come due at the time of the trial. The rents accruing after 
the trial may be recovered through supplemental proceedings for 
any further rents lost or damages incurred. However, plaintiff 
is imposed with its ongoing duty to mitigate its damages. 
DATED this cJ'^day of Jonualry^ 1990 . 
BY THE COURT: 
V^~i ^ui/^ 
ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Approved as to form: 
George A. Hunt 
Attorney for Defendant 
Standard Optical Company 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to 
George A. Hunt, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, 
Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this ^ day of Janu-
ary, 1990: — 
384:010290C 
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A G R E Z M ^ N T 
THIS AGREEMENT made and executed in duplicate this 10th day of 
August, 1982 by and between W, Daniel English as party of the firs: part ard 
hereinafter called the Lessor, and Standard Optical Company, of Salt Lake City 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as party of the second part and hereinafter 
called the Lessee. 
That in consideration of the payments hereinafter reserved to be paid 
by the Lessee to the Lessor and the terms and provisions of this agreement 
to be kept and performed by each party to the other, the Lessor does by 
these presents hereby let and lease unto the Lessee, ~ho does hereby agree 
to accept as leased property and premises and in accordance with the terms and 
provisions of this agreement, the following described office space and 
premises situated in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, State of Jtah, and 
more particularly described as follows: 
Commercial unit one (1) in the building located at 3525 Market 
Street, in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, State of Utan, 
containing approximately two thousand'One hundred (2100) aquare 
feet of floor space together with available parking space 
allocated on percentage of total square footage each tennant 
occupies of total building square footage. 
To have and to hold said premises and office space under the cerns 
of this agreement for a term of ten (10) years beginning on the 1st day of 
the month following written notice to Lessee from Lessor, and terminating 
at midnight on the last day of the same month ten years hence. 
The Lessee does hereby unconditionally agree to pay as rent for :He 
demised premises and to the Lessor, or order, at West Valley City, Salt La<e 
County,Utah, the sum of $1000.00 each month for 36 months with the first 
such installment payment to be due and payable on or before the 1st day of 
September, 1982, and each installment payment to be due thereinafter bv on 
or before that same calendar day during the term of the agreement A grace 
period of five days is given for the making of any such installment pavnent. 
The monthly rent specified in the section above shall be negotiated 
every 36 months. 
It is mutually understood and agreed by these parties that the demised 
premises herein will be used by the Lessee as a retail optical business a^d 
Lessee does hereby agree to use said premises for no other purposes without 
the written consent of the Lessor first had and obtained, however, such cor.se: 
will not be unreasonably withheld. 
The Lessor does hereby agree to pay the general taxes assessed against 
the property and premises herein as belongs to the Lessor during the term 
of this agreement. The Lessor does also agree to furnish and pay for water 
for the leased premises and to maintain the exterior of the building in which 
these leased premises are located, except the glass, which shall be the 
responsibility of the Lessee and as hereinafter provided. 
The Lessee does hereby agree to promptly pay the charges for gas, heat, 
electric service and telephone service, and to pay the taxes assessed 
against all personal property of the Lessee as may be in or on the leased 
premises, during the terra of this agreement. 
It is mutually understood and agreed that the premises herein leased 
are in a condition of excellent repair and that the heating units and air 
conditioning units, gas meters and electric neters are provided so as to 
furnish seperate service to the respective tennants in this main building, and 
with respect thereto it is understood and agreed that the Lessee nerein will 
be responsible for the installations of the gas and electric neters and 
deposits thereon in the event the same is required by such respective companies;. 
The Lessee does hereby agree to at all times during the term of this agreement 
keep the heating and air conditioning units in a condition of good repair. 
The Lessee hereby accepts the leased premises in a condition of good 
repair and does hereby agree to at all times during the term of this 
agreement to maintain the interior of said demised premises and keep the sane 
in a condition of good repair at all times, and agrees not to make any 
alterations to the demised premises without the written consent of the Lessor 
first had and obtained, and then that all such alterations shall be made at 
the sole expense of the Lessee and that any such alterations as are then made 
a part of or attached to tne building shall remain with the premises and becomq 
the property of the Tcssor at the end .o* this l-.ise ter-. 
The Lessee does likewise agree to provide suitable floor covering (carpet, tila 
etc) of his choice in said premises, to be responsible for all repairs dene or 
needed to be done to the interior of the demised premises during the t e n of 
this agreement. 
It is mutually understood and agreed chat in che event the demised 
premises are damaged or destroyed by fire or other causes beyond the control 
of the parties herein, that the Lessor shall have the rignt and option as to 
whether or not the premises and building shall be repaired or reouiit, and in 
the event the Lessor elects to make the needed repairs or to rebuild that an 
equitable rental adjustment will be made during such time as the repairs 
or rebuilding is being done, and on completion that the regular rental 
paynents will again become due and payable. In the event the Lessor elects 
not to rebuild or repair the premises, then it is agreed that the Lessor aay 
declare this agreement terminated in which event both parties will be excused 
of any further performance of the terms and provisions herein provided. 
The Lessee does hereby agree to be responsible for all breakage to 
windows and doors in the demised premises and not to install any signs o~ :r.e 
demised premises without the permission of the Lessor. 
The Lessee does hereby agree to accept the demised premises in a state 
of good repair and be responsible for all costs for the installation of t~e 
equipment of the Lessee in said premises. 
As a material part of the consideration for this lease, the Lessee 
covenants to carry adequate liability Insurance, i.e. $100,000 - $300,000 ~n 
connection with the use of occupation of the leased premises and in ccrnec:~o^ 
with his business practice; and the Lessee covenants to save che Lessor's 
premises from any claim or suit which may arise for any injury to ar7 perse-
entering upon said leased premises, arising from the use of leased premises 
by Lessee or the entry or exit of any patient or other person, or fror. :.Ke 
failure of Lessee to keep the leased premises in a safe condition, -itn c^e 
exception of negligence of Lessor. 
The Lessee shall not sublet any portion of the leased prenises without 
the written consent of the Lessors first had and obtained. Nor snail tne 
Lessee assign this lease in whole or in part without the written consent of 
the Lessors. Nor shall an assignment for the oenefit of creditors or to a 
Lessee, be deemed an exception to the prohibition against assigning or 
subletting the leased premises. If Lessee sublets any portion of the office, 
with written consent, over and above present agreed rent, then one-naif of the 
sublet rental shall be added to total rent of Lessor. 
It is agreed that the Lessor will not be liable to the Lessee on account 
of any damage to any property of the Lessee in the demised ire-nises on 
account of the lack of any repairs to any equipment in the demised premises 
as is the responsibility of the Lessee to repair and maintain, and that the 
Lessor shall have the right to any reasonable inspection of the demised 
premises at any reasonable time during the term of this agreement. The 
Lessee does hereby agree to at all times keep the interior of the-demised 
premises in a clean and sanitary condition in accordance with all'good and 
reasonable standards of like commercial units. 
It is mutually agreed Lhat in the event of the failure, neglect or 
default of the Lessee to make payments herein provided, as they become due, 
or within the grace period, that the Lessor shall have the right and option 
to proceed under the terms of the following provisions, or either of tnem: 
(a) To declare this agreement terminated and proceed, with or without 
legal process, to take possession of the demised premises and in vhich event 
this agreement will be terminated and each and both parties will be excused 
of any further performance of the terms and provisions herein sec forth, or 
(b) To take any action necessary to evict the Lessee from Che deaised 
premises, and proceed to make any and all necessary repairs to the property 
and proceed to rent the same to any other person, and in the event it is 
necessary for the Lessor to take a reduction in the rental rate on said 
demised premises that the Lessee will pay to the Lessor, all expenses in 
connection with such repairs, re^ -rjritin,g and any loss of rentals aa aay be 
determined by the rates set forth herein. In this respect it is agreed that 
time is of the essence of this agreement and that the terms and provisions 
herein set forth will extend to and beoome binding upon the respective heirs, 
executors, administrators and assigns of these parties, and that :he Lessee 
shall have no right to make any assignment of any rights under the terms of 
this agreement. 
The Lessee does hereby agree to turn said premises back to tne Lessor at 
the end of this lease term in as good a condition as the premises are ac Che 
commencement of this lease, with only ordinary wear and depreciation being 
excepted. 
The Lessee does hereby agree that all rental charges due by the terms of 
this agreement will be a first lien upon ail property of the Lessee in the 
demised premises and that no part of such fixtures or personal property will 
be removed from the demised premises until all rental charges are paid. 
It is mutually agreed that in the event it becomes necessary for either 
party to enforce the terms of this agreement with court action, aftee default,-
that the party determined to be in default will pay to the opposite p'arty all 
court costs and a reasonable attorneys fees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the said parties have hereunto placed their 
signatures on the day and the year first abov^ written. 
W. Daniel English f 
Lessor 
LESSEE 
STATE OF UTAH ) SS. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Gn Che / ^ r day of , 1982, personally appeared 
before me /£*CJC*^L^ - & / ^-^r .^ &^«~»*rfp > c^e signer of the above i-strur.en: 
who duly acknowledged to me that he executecrthe same. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 
LESSOR 
STATE OF UTAH ) SS. 
County of Sal t Lake ) 
On the day of 
before me 
who duly acknowledged to tne chat he executed the saze. 
_, 1982, personally appeared 
the signer of the above instrument, 
